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ASSIGNMENTS OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES.
POLICIES of life insurance are assignable equally with other
choses in action, and derive much of their utility and value from
such element of assignability: Olmsted v. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593;
St. John v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 13 Id. 3, 31. Such policy
is a writing obligatory for thepayment of a certain sum of money
at a future time, with a right of action against the company issuing
the same upon the happening of the contingency upon which such
payment depends: (hapman v. Mcllwrath, 77 Mo. 38; liut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Allen, 138 Mais. 24. As a non-negotiable chose in
action, an assignee thereof can acquire no greater rights than his
assignor had: Gilbert v. Moose, 104 Penn. St. 72; and is subject
to all equities existing at the time of transfer, and all defences valid
as between the original parties: Harley v. Hfeist, 86 Ind. 196.
Nor can an assignee acquire any greater rights than are given by
the instrument itself : Diffenbach v. Vogeler, 61 Md. 370 ; and the
general words of an assignment are restricted by the particular
words of the policy itself: Armstrong v. Ins. Co., 20 Blatchf. 493.
It is alsb true, however, that such assignment carries with it
every incident or accessory essential to the use or enforcement of
the policy transferred, or that will conduce to the attainment of the
end and purpose in view of the parties to the assignment: Hollisv.
Ins. Co., 12 Phila. 321. And, by reason of the affirmative acts,
omissions or neglects of the owner or assignor of a policy, a bona
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fide assignee thereof for value, without notice, may acquire, under
the rules of equitable estoppel, a good title against all the world:
Norwood v. Guerdon, 60 Ill. 253 ; Wells v. Archer, 10 S. & 11.
412-; Damron v. Penn Nut. Life Ins. Co., 99 Ind. 479 ; ,Etna
Life Ins. (o. v. Prance, 94 U. S. 561 ; Rall v. Dorchester, 111
Mass. 53; Gale v. Lewis, 9 Q. B. 742.
Life insurance policies are assignable by parol and mere delivery:
West v. Carolina Rns. Co., 31 Ark. 476; Soule v. Union Bank,
45 Barb. 111 ; Malone's Estate, 8 W. N. C. 179; Chapman v.
Mcllwrath, 77 Mo. 28 ; Stout v. Yeager Co., 13 T.'R. 802 ; Marcus v. St. Louis Hut. L,ife Ins. Co., 68 N. Y. 625 ; Griffey v. Ins.
Co., 30 Hun 299; Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 421 ; Hudson v.
Merrifield, 57 Ind. 24; Moore v. Woolsey, 4 E. & B. 243; Jones
v. Consolidated Ins. Co., 2 Beav. 256; -Durfaur v. Professional
Ins. Co., 25 Id. 603; -Bartv. Forbes, 60 Miss. 745; Williams's
Appeal, 10 Out. 116. Possession of a policy is prima facie evidence of title, and of the right to demand and receive of the insurance company the money due thereon at the time when by its
terms it is contracted to be paid: Page v. Burnstine, 102 U. S.
664 ; Armstrong v. Ins. ( o., 20 Blatchf. 493 ; Collins v. .Dawley,
4 Col. 138. Lord MANSFIELD says, "it gives a lien at law :"
Godin v. L. Assur. Co., 1 Burr. 489. Any act on the part of the
owner of an insurance policy showing not only a present intention
to transfer, but that he regards himself as having carried that transfer into effect, is sufficient to constitute an assignment: Swift v. By.
Conductors' Hut. Ass'n, 96 Ill. 309 ; Chowne v. Baylis, 31 Beav.
351 ; Malone's Estate, supra; Wood v. Phwnix ins. Co., 22 La.
Ann. 617. An equitable title to policies can be acquired without
any formal writing, such being the mutual intentions of the parties:
St. John v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 13 N. Y. 31; Marcus v. St.
Louis Nut. Life ITns. Co., 68 Id. 625; Malone's Estate, 8 W. N.
C. 179 ; Cook v. Black, I Hare 390. The assignability of policies is generally declared by the terms thereof: Pomeroy v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 398 ; .Mutual ProtectionITns. Co. v.
Hamilton, 5 Sneed 269. They are usually made payable to the
beneficiary "or assigns." The policy, when made so payable, is
generally rendered more available as security by indorsement as
well as delivery : Shearmanv. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 46 N. Y. 526;
Merrifield v. Baker, 11 Allen 43; Collins v. -Dawley,4 Col. 138;
Durfaur v. Ins. Co., 25 Beav. 599. But a policy is assignable
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although not made payable "to assign :" Archibald v. Aut. Life
Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 542 ; .Delonge v. Elliott, 23 N. J. Eq. 486. An
indorsement in blank is sufficient to pass the title, as by suc
dorsement is implied an express or implied authority from the party
signing to the person to whom it is delivered to fill up the blanks in
accordance with the intentions of the parties; for where a party has
power to do a thing, and means to do it, the instrument he employs
is to be construed so as to give effect to his intention: Norwood v.
Guerdon, 60 Il. 253 ; Fowler v. Butterly, 78 N. Y. 68 ; Lemon v.
Phenix .MAt. Life Ins. Co., 38 Conn. 294; Bond v. Bunting, 78
Penn. St. 213. Otherwise, where such blank assignment is obtained by coercion: Whitridge v. Barry,42 Md. 140. An assignee
of the insurance policies, requiring indorsement as well as delivery
to perfect the legal title, and deposited as collateral upon an agreement to execute such indorsement, the assignor dying before complying with such agreement, will be aided in equity by a decree
against the company for the payment of the amount due on tbe policy, with interest, without a formal assignment: Curtius v. Caledonian Ins. Co., L. R., 19 Ch. Div. 534; Crossley 'v. Glasgow
Life Ins. Co., 4 Id. 421 ; Webster v. British Empire Life Ins.
Co., 15 Id. 169. No title, however, can be acquired to policies
although assigned by endorsement and delivery by both husband and
wife, where made payable to a wife or to wife and children, or to
minor children, in jurisdictions where such assignments are prohibited by statute, or held to be against public policy: (Jhapin v.
.i'ellowes, 36 Conn. 132; Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Weitz,
99 Mass. 157 ; Borroughs v. State .fut. .Lfe .ins.Co., 97 Id. 359 ;
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Applegate, 7 Ohio St. 292; Bond v.
Ins. Co, 9 Phila. 149; affirmed 78 Penn. St. 213; Turner v.
Quincy Ins. Co., 109 Mass. 573; Bicker v. Oak Life .ins.Co.,
27 Minn. 193: Pence v. -- akepeace. 65 Ind. 345; Glanz v.
Gloeckler, 101 Ill 573; Mallory v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 38 N. Y.
294; Stokell v. Kimball, 59 N. H. 13.
Delivery of the policy is essential to the validity of an assignment. It may be by some act or conduct, which at law or in equity
will be regarded as a substantial compliance with the rule; Fowler
v. Butherby, 78 N. Y. 68 ; Conard v. Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 449; Lemon
v. Phenix Ins. o.. 38 Conn. 294 ; Pence v. Makepeace, 65 Ind.
345; Wood v. Phkenix Life Ins. Co., 22 La. Ann. 617. So notice
to the company of- an assignment without possession, will sustain
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anassignment; Palmer v. Merrill, 6 Cush. 282; Chowne v. Bay.
lis, 31 Beav. 85. The rule was applied to a creditor, who promised
an insurance policy as collateral, failed by negligence to obtain it
before the death of his debtor: Sue. of De Meza, 26 La. Ann. 35.
And a prior assignee with possession is preferred in equity: .Diffenbach v. Vogeler, 61 Md. 870; Spencer v. Clarke, L. R., 9 Ch.
Div. 137. But where a policy was deposited as security, without
notice to the company, and the insured, by false representations,
obtained a duplicate copy and assigned it by deed to his wife, it was
held that if the wife took the assignment without' notice of the
fraud, she had a legal right and equity superior to that of the first
assignee: Le Feuvre v. Sullivan, 10 Moore's Pr. C. 0. 1; Spencer
v. Clarke, L. R., 9 Ch. Div. 137. Consent of the assignee, however, to the assignment, is requisite to its validity, where delivered
to a third party not an agent of the assignee for any purpose :
.Haitv. Forbes, 60 Miss. 745; Sue. of _ichardson,14 La. Ann. 1.
,--Policies delivered to an assignee as security for advances less in
amount than the value of the policies, may be assigned for other
loans upon notice to the first assignee, and such assignment is sustained as an equitable appropriation of any surplus to the benefit
of the second or later assignee: Marts v. Ins. 'Co., 44 N. J. L.
478 ; Diffenbach v. Vogeler, 61 Md. 370 ; City Bank v. Ass. Co.,
32 W. R. 658; Myers v. Guarantee Co., 7 DeG., M. & S. 112.
Assignments of part interests in policies are sustained as vesting an
equitable right therein: Palmer v. Merrill, 6 Cush. 282; Pomeroy
v. Manhattan L. Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 398 ; especially if the company
consents: Woods v. _utland Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 31 Vt. 552. It
was doubted, however, whether an assignment, qua assignment, was
sufficient to pass the title where a policy had been made payable to
the person upon whose life it was taken out, and upon delivery of
the policy, at his request, the agent of the company immediately
made an assignment thereof to a third party, a copy of which was
sent to the general office, but none to the assignee, and no notice
was ever given to him, the assignor retaining the policyand paying
the premiums until the day of his death: Scott v. Dickson, 16 W.
N. C. 181. But, in a like case, where a policy was made payable
to B., but was retained and the premiums paid by A., B. being ignorant of the transaction, and A. afterwards sought to change the
policy so as to make it payable to himself, but the company refused
without the consent of B., the court held that it had no power to
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pany is estopped after notice of an assignment to set up as a defence
against a bona fide holder for value, that it paid the proceeds of the
policy to the beneficiary or any other person : Hall v. Dorchester
Mut. Ins. Co., 111 Mass. 53 ; aale v. Lewis, 9 Q. B. 742. But
notice must be proved: NZorthwestern Hut. Life Ins. Co. v. Both,
87 Penn. St. 409. And also, where it has consented to an assignment, to deny the validity thereof, as against a bonafide holder for
value: .Etna Tife Ins. Co. v. Prance, 94 U. S. 561 ; Stevens v.
Warren, 101 Mass. 564; or to set up a prohibition in the policy
against assignments without the consent of the company where
made as collateral, or where the interests of the company are not
affected: E-llis v. .Irentzinger,27 Mo. 311 ; Gr ffey v. Ins. Co., 80
Hun 299 ; Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 421 ; St. John v. Ins. Co.,
13 N. Y. 3 ; nor where such clause is illegal: Spare v. Ins Co.,
17 Fed. Rep. 568.
And where a policy was allowed by a company to lapse and be
forfeited, but without the consent or knowledge of the beneficiary,
and a new policy, issued in place thereof, was assigned as collateral
to a 'bona fide assignee for value, the company was estopped as
against the beneficiary from allegingher neglect to tender premiums due on a policy already forfeited; and also estopped as against
the innocent assignee, from setting up the defence that an assignee
of an insurance policy could acquire no greater rights than those
of his assignor: Tilcher v. New Yorki1n8. Qo., 83 La. Ann. 322.
And where a person seeking insurance makes a full and complete
statement of all facts that materially affect the risk, and an agent
of the company, acting on its behalf, of his own accord, writes false
answers to the usual questions, to be signed by the applicant, with
the advice to him that the omitted facts are immaterial, and the
assured, in good faith, adopts the application as prepared, the company is estopped to deny its liability on the policy, after receiving
premiums, a loss having occurred: Massachusetts v. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 98 Ill. 824. Nor can an insurance company
acquire any rights against a bona fide holder by mis-statements of
facts and law made by its agents in its company's business relative
to a forfeiture of a policy: Tabor v. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
44 Mich. 324. But unauthorized representations of an agent will
not create an estoppel: Knight v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 37 Leg.
Int. 82.
The title of the assignee of an insurance policy being non-nego-
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tiable in its character is, in the absence of any application of the
rules of equitable estoppel, subject to all equities existing at the
time of the transfer and to all defences valid as between the original
parties. A valid policy was issued to a wife, and afterwards, by coercion, she executed an assignment of it, and the fraudulent assignee
assigned it to a bonafide purchaser, without notice; it was held that
no title could be acquired even by an innocent purchaser to a chose
in action from one who has procured it from the owner by undue influence, compulsion or coercion. Barry v. .Equitable Life Tns. Co.,
59 N. Y. 587 The assignee must, like other assignees of nonnegotiable choses in action, inquire of the debtor, before advancing
money, if any defence or equities exist in relation thereto, as a
policy of insurance is not a representation of the company, but
only a muniment of title, and no title can be acquired even by a bona
fide assignee for value from one without title obtaining the same
from a fraudulent agent: CharterOak Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 40
Ohio St. 414. And a rule that an assignee cannot rely upon the
recitals of an insurance policy, was enforced in a case where by
failare of an assignee to pay a premium note, although the policy
recited that it was paid, a forfeiture thereof was sustained. Now
v. Union gut. Life Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 32. Nor can an assignee
of a policy as collateral require payment without complying with
the terms of the policy by obtaining the receipt of the beneficiary
indorsed thereon ; non eonstat the debt may have been paid, Kelley
v. Caplice, 23 Kan. 474. Nor can he rely upon unauthorized
representations of an agent: Knqht v. Akutual Life Ins. Co., 37
Leg. Int. 82. Nor can any title be acquired to policies of life insurance where illegal although the loans and debts secured be larger
in amount than the value of the policy: Stokell v. Kimball, 59
N. H. 13; and an assignment of policies by a wife as surety will
be released by a discharge of an endorser: O'Iarav. .Niugent, 37
N. J. Eq. 326.
The Rights of the Asszqnor.-The assignor or pledgor is entitled
to a return of insurance policies upon complying with the terms
of the agreement upon which such assignment was made. Although
the assignment be absolute in terms, an agreement in parol that
the assignor should have a right to redeem at any time upon repayment, with interest, of the premiums paid by the assignee, will be
enforced in equity. Such right of redemption followed the policy
into the hands of the assignee, and at all times affected his title:
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.Matthews v. Sheehan, 69 N. Y. 589. The rule was enforced in
another case where an insurance policy was assigned in absolute
terms, but the assignee (who was the agent of the company issuing
the policy) delivered a receipt at the same time reciting that the assignment was as collateral security for the premium, and to be void
if the note was paid at maturity, otherwise to continue for sole
benefit of the agent. The company was notified of the assignment, but not of the receipt, and the note not boing paid, the agent
surrendered the policy. Prior to the surrender the company were
informed of the facts, the assignor demanding a retransfer, the
policy being of greater value than the amount of the note. Upon
an equitable action to redeem, it was held that as no notice had
been given to redeem before the surrender, it must be treated
as made on account of the assignor as well as the assignee, and that
he was entitled to any excess of value above the amount due on the
premium note: Dongan v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 46 Md. 469.
So, where an assignee of a policy holding the same as collateral
security wrongfully surrendered it to the company, he was mulcted
in damages for the conversion : Wheeler v. Peters, 40 Ohio St.
424. The pledgor is also entitled upon settlement to the benefit
of any sums which have been collected by the pledgee on such
insurance policies, and to which the assignor would be entitled on
payment of the debt: White v. British _Empire Ins. Co., L. R., 7
Eq. 394.
Payment of the debt or the discharge of the obligation is essential to entitle the assignor to a return of collateral securities, as
where policies of insurance were assigned as collateral security to
secure the payment of certain bills of exchange, although an
arbitration has fixed the amount of the account, the money not
having been paid: Scott v. Campbell, 1 Camp. 216. And where
assurance policies were assigned as collateral for the payment of a
bond and mortgage, and the mortgage had been discharged, but the
bond not paid: Hollis v. Ins. (o., 12 Phila. 321. Nor can an
assignor, who during minority as a beneficiary joined -with his
father in an assignment thereof as collateral to secure the assignee
from liability as endorser, and under which the assignee had been
obliged to pay a portion of the liability, repudiate the contracc
on coming of age, and recover the policy, during the lifetime of the
assured, by an action of detinue: Bowers v. Parker, 58 N. H.
565. But it was held payment where a company issuing a policy
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received it and other securities as collateral for the payment of
premium notes, the policy by its terms being void if the assured
died by his own hands, except as to any bonafide interest therein
at the time of death. The company was held within the rule, and
the proceeds of the policy having paid the debt, it was ordered to
redeliver the other securities: White v. Penn Hut. Life Ins. Co.,
6 Mo. App. 587. And a deposit of policies as collateral was held
within the exception : Cook v. Black, 1 Hare 390. Nor was it
any defence to a suit upon the original indebtedness that the creditor
held an insurance policy upon the life of the debtor as collateral
Reeves v. Plough, 41 Ind. 204; Burrows v. Bangs, 84 Mich.
304.
InsurableInterests as applied to Assignees.-An important question relative to the assignment of valid life insurance policies is, as
to the intention of the parties in procuring such insurance, whether
it is in fact a bona fide assignment, for a valuable consideration, or
simply a cover for a gaming speculation in the life of the insured,
and in arriving at such intention the extent or character of the
insurable interest of the assignee in the life, is a fact for consideration: Johnson v. Van -Epps, 14 Ill. App. 201. Generally, it
may be said, that an assignee of valid insurance policies, in common
with assignees of other choses in action, is entitled to the presumption that he is a bona fide holder for value, without notice: Page
v. Burnstine, 102 U. S. 664. The fact that he has no insurable
interest in the life of the assured does not create a presumption that
he acquired his interest under such assignment for the purpose of
speculating or gambling upon the life of the assured: Clark v.Allen,
11 R. I. 439. Nor is this fact either conclusive nor prima faeie
evidence that the transaction is illegal: United Life Ins. Co. v.
Allen, 188 Mass. 240. No subsequent assignment can destroy the
validity of a policy that was legal when issued: Campbell v. _New
-EnglandLife Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 881 ; nor taint it as a wagering
policy : Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 50 Id. 18. Even where made
the basis of a mere speculation or wager on the part of the assignee,
so that no recovery is permitted to him, yet the beneficiary of the
policy may enforce the same, the validity of the policy not being
affected by the subsequent illegality. And unless there is some
peculiarity about the rules that should govern the assignment of
policies of insurance, where the assignee has no insurable interest
in the life of the assured, the same rules as to its validity should
VOL. XXIII.-96
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govern such assignments as are applied to assignments of interests
under wills and vested remainders: In re ITrving, L. R., 7 Ch.D.
419. In all these cases, although the value of the investment
depends upon the life of a person in which the assignee has no
interest except the expectancy of its cessation, the validity of such
assignments is not questioned.
The courts have considered in several cases this question of the
insurable interest required by the assignee to render valid an assignment of life insurance policies, and the general rule seems' to
be that such assignments are supported where a valid insurance policy has been issued, and the owner sells the, same in a bona fide
transaction, for the purpose of securing its present value, or where
the owner, in a like bona fide transaction, assigns such policy as
collateral to secure a bona fide advance or a valid debt, or some
obligation as endorser or surety, and the advance or debt has been
paid or the obligation discharged, although in the first case, the
assignee has no insurable interest in the life of the insured at the
time of the assignment, and in the second, his insurable interest
has ceased, and he is an assignee as in the first case, without insurable interest in the life of the assured.
In a recent case, Scott v. Dickson, 16 W. N. 0. 181, decided by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, a policy of life insurance was
issued to Dickson, and upon delivery by the agent, Dickson said
he wished to transfer the policy to Scott, "the best friend I have
in the world." He executed the assignment, notice of it was sent
to the company, but Scott was never informed of it. Scott, at the
time, was surety on a penal bond given by Dickson, but the liability ceased, and at his decease he was without insurable interest
in the life of Dickson. The assignment was supported on the
ground that the original insurance was for the benefit of the assignee.
The court (Mr. Justice PAXSON) say:
"It requires but a moment's reflection to see that this rule [that
the assignment of a policy does not fall upon the cessation of interest] is based upon sound principles. It treats a contract of life
insurance not as a contract of indemnity, as in the case of fire and
marine insurance, but as a contract to pay a certain sum of money
in the event of death. And if a policy failed with the cessation of
interest, it would lead to this result: A. is a creditor of B. to the
extent of a $1000, and insures his life to that amount, and continues the policy until he has paid in premiums say, $1100. If
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the policy ceases as soon as the debt is paid, A. loses ill he has
paid, and in reality is out $100. although he has received the debt
in full. * * * Policies of this sort are not in any sense wagering.
It would be to deny a man's right to do what he will with his
own to say that he could not insure his life for the benefit of an
indigent relative or a friend to whom he felt under obligations. And
the fact that he continues to pay the premiums himself, and retains
the control of the policy up to the time of his death, leaves no room
for speculation, or the improper practices of a few years ago
which brought such a scandal upon the life insurance business
of this state."
And referring to the case of Gilbert v. Moore, infra, said: "we
do not regard this as within the-authority of Gilbert v. Moore, for
the reason that there is nothing in the facts as set forth in the case
stated, from which the deduction can fairly be drawn that this was
a wagering policy. On the contrary, there is enough to show that
John F. Scott had an insurable interest in the life of Richard
Dickson."
In an earlier case, Cunningham v. Smith, 70 Penn. St. 4.50, in
which Smith insured his life, and immediately assigned the policy
to the defendants, the court'say : "Smith's interest in his own life
was unquestionable, and if he was willing to insure himself, with
their money, and then assign his policy to them there is ho principle of law which can prevent such a transaction."
Another recent decision on this question was delivered by the
Supreme Judicial'Court of Massachusetts in the case of the Nut.
Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24. This was a
bill of interpleader filed by the insurance company to determine
whether the wife of the deceased, the beneficiary in the policy, or
the assignee, Allen, were entitled to the proceeds, the assignment
being made for a sum paid, and the surrender of notes of the assured upon which surrender he had no insurable interest in the life.
The court (W. ALLEN, J.) say: "The question is, whether the
right to a sum of money payable on the death of a person under a
contract in the form of an insurance policy has any special character or quality which renders it less assignable than the right to a
sum payable at the death of some person under any other contract
or assurance, or than a remainder in real estate expectant on -such
death. We see nothing in the contract of life insurance which will
prevent the assured from selling his right under the contract for his

764

ASSIGNMENTS OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES.

own advantage, and we are of opinion that an assignment of a policy made by the assured in good faith for the purpose of obtaining
its present value, and not as a gaming risk between him and the
assignee, or a cover for a contract of insurance between the insurer
and the assignee, will pass the equitable interest of the assignor;
and that the fact that the assignee has no insurable interest in the
life insured is neither conclusive nor prima facie evidence that the
transaction is illegal. * * * The value and permanency of the interest is material only as bearing upon the question whether the
policy is taken out in good faith, and not as a gambling transaction.
If valid in its inception it will not be avoided by a cessation of the
interest. The mere fact that the assured himself has no interest in
the life does not avoid or annul the policy. We think that the second ruling was correct, and that the fact that the assignee had
no insurable interest in the life does not avoid the assignment.
It is one circumstance to be regarded in determining the character
of the transaction, but is not conclusive of its illegality."
The court, referring to Sevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 564, and
in effect overruling the case, as to the point in question, say: "The
general rule laid down in Stevens v. Warren, that no one can have
an insurance upon the life of another, unless he has an interest in
the continuance of that life, and from which the inference that an
assignee of a party must have an insurable interest, seems to have
been drawn, we think, is not strictly accurate or may be misleading.
An insurable interest in the assured at the time the policy is taken
out is necessary to the validity of the policy, but it is not necessary
to the continuance of the insurance that the interest should continue;
if the interest should cease, the policy would continue, and the
insured would then have an insurance without interest."
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Gonnecticut Hut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457, in which the policy was
payable to a husband and wife, and they were afterwards divorced
d vinculo matrimonii, the wife, having paid the premiums to the
death of the husband, was allowed to collect the insurance, although
her insurable interest had ceased at the time of the divorce. And
Mr. Justice BRADLEY, speaking for the court said "We do not hesitate
to say that a policy taken out in good faith, and valid at its inception,
is not avoided by the cessation of the insurable interest, unless such
be the necessary effect of the insurance policy itself." And in
Etna Life Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U. S. 561, where a policy was
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taken out for the benefit of a sist-r, the court sustained the policy,
saying that "he had a right to take out a policy on his own life for
his sister's benefit, and she had a right to advance him the necessary moneys to do so. As between strangers or persons not thus
clearly connected, the transaction would be evidence to go to the
jury from which, according to the circumstances of the case, they
might or might not infer that it was mere, gambling. Any person
has a right to procure an insurance on his life and to assign it
to another, provided it be not done by way of cover for a wager
policy."
The rule that an insurable interest in the life of the assured is
not essential to constitute a valid assignment of valid life insurance
policies has been consistently applied by the courts of New York:
St. John v. American Mutual Life Ins. Co., 13 N. Y. 81 ; Valton v. NP'ationalFund Life Ins. Co., 20 N. Y. 32. In a late case
in the Court of Appeals, Olmsted v. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593, a policy
was issued to Olmsted, as trustee for the wife and children of Keyes,
and the wife dying, and Keyes again remarrying, the trustee, at the
request of the assured, assigned the policy to the second wife and
children. The court say: " The rule as gathered from the authorities is that where one takes out a policy upon his own life as an
honest and bona fide transaction, and the amount assured is made
payable to a person having no interest in the life, or where such a
policy is assigned to one having no interest in the life, the beneficiary, in the one case, and the assignee in the other, may hold and
enforce the policy, if it was valid in its inception, and the policy
was not procured, or the assignment made as a contrivance to circumvent the law against betting, gaming or wagering policies. It
follows, therefore, that one may with the consent of the insurer,
deal with a valid life policy as he can with any other chose in action,
selling it, assigning it, disposing of it and bequeathing it by -will-;
and it has been well said that if he could not do it these life policies
would be deprived of a large share of their utility and value."
The like rule has been enforced by the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island, in Otark v. Allen, 11 R. 1.439, where a policy was assigned
upon the surrender of a note for an amount larger than the surrender value of the policy. The court say : "If the danger is not
sufficient to avoid the policy when the interest ceases, why should
it be sufficient to avoid the assignment to an assignee without interest ? The truth is,' it is one thing to say that a man may take
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insurance upon the life of another for no purpose except as a speculation or bet on the chances of life, and may repeat the act ad
libitum, and juite another thing to say that he may purchase the
policy as a matter of business after it has once been issued under
the sanction of law, and istherefore an existing chose in action or
right of property.which its owner may have the best of reasons for
wishing to dispose of. There is in such a purchase, in our opinion,
no immorality and no imminent peril to human life. * * * It is
said that such an assignment, if permitted, may be used to circumvent the law. That is true if insurance without interest is
unlawful, but it does not follow that such an assignment is not to
be permitted at all, because, perhaps, it may be abused. Let the
abuse, not the bona fide use, be condemned and defeated. * * *
Perhaps, Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 644, may be found a case
of that kind."
The like rule has been enforced inNew Jerseyin TrentonMut.Lfe
"Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 24 N. J. L. 576; and in Martin v.
Franklin F. Ins. Co., 38 Id. 140 ; in Vermont, in Fairchildv.
Life Ass'n., 51 Vt. 613 ; and in England, in Dalby v. India &
London Life Ass'n., 15 .B. 365; Law v. London Indisputable
Life Policy Co., 1 Kay & J. 223. A. insured his life and afterward assigned it to B. for a nominal consideration; B.'s executors
assigned the policy to 0. for a nominal consideration, and C.'s executors sold it to D., and having a good title, were allowed to enforce
the sale: Ashley v. Ashley, 3 Sim. 149.
It is also well settled law that an assignment of valid insurance
policies will not be enforced by any oourt where the transaction of
assignment itself shows the want of a good and valuable consideration, and the circumstances connected therewith demonstrate that
the assignment was obtained simply as a cover for a gambling speculation or a wagering bet upon the chances of the life of another.
And in considering the character of the transaction, the insurable interest in the life of the assured is a fact to be considered. The rule
was applied in a case in the Supreme Court of the United States,
Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775, where a valid policy of life
insurance was procured and immediately assigned to a firm, upon an
agreement that it should pay all premiums and assessments, and
as consideration receive nine-tenths of the amount due thereon at
his death. The firm paid the fees and assessments, and collected
the agreed amount upon the death of the assured. Upon these facts
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the court (Mr. Justice FIELD) say : " It was lawful for the association to advance to the assured the sums payable to the insurance
company as they became due. It was also lawful for the assured to
assign the policy as security for their payment. The assignment
was only invalid as a transfer of the policy beyond what was required to refund these sums with interest. To hold it valid for the
whole proceeds would be to sanction speculative risks on human life
and encourage the evil for which wager policies are condemned. * * *
The assignment of a policy to a party not having an insurable interest is as objectionable as the taking out of a policy in his name.
Nor is the character changed because it is for a portion merely of
the insurance money to the extent that the assignee stipulates for
the proceeds of the policy beyond the sum advanced by him, he
stands in the position of holding a wager policy. * * * In all cases,
there must be a reasonable ground founded upon the relations of
the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to
expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life
of the assured. Otherwise, the contract is a mere wager, by which
the party taking the policy is directly interested in the early death
of the assured. Such policies have a tendency to create a desire
for the event. They are, therefore, independent of any statute on
the subject, condemned as being against public policy. The same
ground which invalidates the. one should invalidate the other-so
far at least as to restrict the right of the assignee to the sums actually advanced by him."
The like rule was enforced in (Jammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 644,
in which Lewis, being indebted $70 to Cammack, at the instance
of the latter, procured an insurance upon his life for $3000, and
assigned a two-thirds interest in the same to Lewis, and also gave
him a note of $3000, confessedly without consideration. Upon
Cammack's death, which occurred after the payment of one premium, Lewis paid $1000 to the widow and she brought an action
to recover the remainder. The court (Mr. Justice MILLER) described the transaction so far as Cammack was concerned, as "a
sheer wagering policy, and probably a fraud on the insurance company. To procure a policy for $3000 to cover a debt of $70, is of
itself a mere wager. The disproportion between the real interest
of the creditor and the amount to be received by him deprives it
of all pretence to be a bona fide effort to secure the debt, and the
strength of this fact-is not diminished by the fact that Cammack
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was to get $2000 out of the $300a; nor is it weakened by the fact
that the policy was taken out in the name of Lewis, and assigned
by him to Cammack." And the assignee was only allo~ved to retain
the amount of the debt and the premium paid.
The latest case in Pennsylvania, Gilbert v. Moose, 104 Penn. St.
74, in which the rule announced in Pritchet v. 1ns. 0o., 3 Yeates
458, decided in 1803, and recognised in later cases, Edgell v. McLaughlin, 6 Whart. 176 ; Adams v. Ins. Co., 1 Rawle 97, was
followed, arose from a transaction which stamped it as a mere speculation. Gilbert insured his life for $2000, naming as beneficiary
one Jacobs, who bad no insurable interest in his life; and be assigned the policy to Gilbert' for $28, who, after payment of one
premium, collected the money due on the policy, Moose having
died. His administrators were alloved to recover the money, less
assessments, the policy being held valid. The court (GORDON, J.)
say : " We do not overlook the fact that the status of Jacobs (the
first assignee), is the point of this case, for if he was the proper and
lawful beneficiary, then even were Gilbert without right, the plaintiffs could not recover, for proceeds of the policy would belong to
Jacobs, and on the other hand, if his claim was not good he had
nothing to assign to the defendant. But as a beneficiary merely,
having no interest in the life, it seems to us very clear that he could
lawfully have no interest in the policy. * * * Nor can we see thai did
the defendant's case rest on an assignment from Moose to himself,
how it would be bettered in the least. The reserved point alleges
that Gilbert took the assignment for the purposes of speculation, and
of this there can be no doubt, for, for what other purpose could it
have been taken ? But speculation, on what ? The life of Moose,
and the sooner that was determined, the better the speculation. If
there is any difference between this and an original wager policy, I
confess I cannot see it."
The like rule was enforced in Indiana, in FranklinLife Ins.Oo.
v. ilazzard, 41 Ind. 116, where a policy for $3000 was assigned
for $20. The policy became payable shortly afterwards, the assignee having paid but one premium. The Supreme Court say :
"Life insurance policies are assignable ; but, in our opinion, they
are not assignable to one who buys merely as matter of speculation
without interest in the life of the assured." In Missouri Valley
Life Ins. Co., 18 Kans. 93, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in a
case where a policy of insurance procured by one Haynes, for $2000,
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was assigned to Sturges, who was without insurable interest in his
life, the assured dying in less than a year after the assignment, say:
"If the assignment from Haynes to Sturges were to be upheld as
valid under the law, it would be virtually saying that the law authorizes mere wagering speculations, mere mercenary traffic concerning human life, and it would be opening the door wide and
inviting to enter the most shocking crimes." See State v. Winner,17
Kans. 298. The like rule has been enforced in Maine, in "vitchell
v. Union L ifeIs.Co., 45 Me. 104; in Missouri, in Singleton v.
St. Louis Life Ins. (o., 66 Mo. 63; and in the United States
Circuit, District of Missouri, by Judges DILLON and TREAT, in
Swick v. Home Life Ins. Co., 2 Dill. 161 ; and in Illinois, in Guardian Nut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rqogan, 80 Ill. 35. In Johnson v. Van
Epps, 14 Ill. App. 201, the court (PILLSBURY, J.,) say: "Whether a contract of insurance is void, being within the prohibition of
the law against gambling, depends not so much upon the exte nt or
character of the interest or the want of interest in such beneficiary,
as it does upon the intention of the parties in procuring such
insurance." See, also, Langdon v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Am.
L. Reg. (N. S.) 385, and note.
It is an equitable rule, however, that assignments of valid life
insurance policies, although the circumstances attending such assignment are such that a court will refuse to enforce the same
for the whole amount of the policy, for the reason that the transaction is, on its face, a mere speculation or gambling wager upon
the life of the assured, are yet held valid in favor of assignees as
to all sums actually loaned, with interest, and premiums and assessments paid by the assignee to preserve the vitality of the policy:
Warnock v. .Davis, 104 U. S. 775; Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co.
v. Weitz, 99 Mass. 157; Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643;
Harley v. Heist, 86 Ind. 196. And this equitable right was enforced in favor of an assignee holding policies of life insurance as
collateral in a transaction voidable for fraud: In re Leslie, L. R.,
23 Oh. D. 552. And also where the assignment was partly void:
Scobey v. Waters, 10 Lea 551.
And in other cases, a lien can be acquired upon policies by the
payment of premiums under a contract with the beneficial owner,
or where persons have advanced money to trustees for that purpose: Clack v. Holland, 19 Bear. 262; Todd v. foorehouse,
L. R., 19 Eq. 69.
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